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10 December 1975

NOTE TO: Mr. Carver

SUBJECT: Comments on Role of DCI (For Senate Select on 11 December)

pp 3-4 Section 3(a) on guidance documents

-- Should note FOCUS exercises -- probably one of most useful and likely-to-~~endorse~~ ENDURE Colby innovations for guidance.

p 8 NSC for NSA

p 8 2nd option requires a staff for SIO. Hence, this is another "con" for insertion on top of p. 10 (Option 1 has same "con.")

GENERAL COMMENT:

One understands and sympathizes with DCI's desire to avoid plumping hard for one or another of these options, at this point. But that need not preclude coming down hard on one dynamic point toward the end of these remarks, viz. As noted at the outset, DCI has great responsibilities for IC, but lacks commensurate authority. Under any option or combination which preserves the DCI as head of the Community, the litmus test of whether he is to have authority commensurate with responsibility will be the powers assigned him to exert desired influence on budgetary proposals to the President (and the Congress) for intelligence activities. Unless and until this authority is enhanced in concrete and persuasive fashion, any effort to make him in fact the leader of the national intelligence effort will be merely pious gesture. And unless he (or a super IO) is given this authority, the main clout will lie with the military.

KSC

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STAT

COMMENTS ON [ ] REPORT

pp 28-30 Section IV Actions to Prevent Abuses, etc.

First two options don't take account of fact that it was presidential abuse of CIA that lay at root of much of trouble. Whether President will buy any system designed to insure against repetition of this, which some would view as encroaching on his authority, fact is, public and Congress will want to provide insurance against it. A delicate subject, but not one to be ignored.

p 21 Title of paragraph 3 should be "Coordination of Intelligence Activities which Impact on Non-intelligence policies"

(Present title is misleading -- suggest delete if substantive intell to substantive policy)

p 33 Whatever the best answer to the problem of reviewing covert activities may be, I find it hard to imagine that adding the Attorney General to the 40 Ctte would solve very much.

p 41 See marginal comments

p 45 Not clear what is meant by DCI having "broad responsibility for production of national intelligence" and then immediately turning this responsibility over to D/CIA. How does this work?

p 49 See margin note

p 58 ditto

p 59 ditto

p 75 Experience of 20+ years of consumer surveys, (occuring on the average at 3 and 1/2 year intervals) convinces me that they aren't worth the effort -- considered as formal institutionalized affairs. Really effective fine-tuning of consumer-producer relationships is a persuasive matter that goes on all the time. If the NIOs aren't doing it well, they should improve. But improvement is not likely to come through laying on surveys conducted by amatuers.

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GENERAL COMMENT. One appreciates the reasons, but the emphasis in this report as presenting abusers and illegalities is allowed to thoroughly overshadow the other criteria; particularly timely and quality national intell. The report is painfully attentive to the question of presenting CRIMES, and fairly attentive to resource management, but awfully thin on quality control and fuzzy where it does mention this subject.

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